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Sometimes I seem to learn an infinity of things at once. When I
am told that "multiplication is associative," I seem to leam that 1X2
= 2 X 1,4 X 5 = 5 X 4, and so forth. I find it hard to believe that I
could have been conscious of those infinitely many facts when I
learned them, even though I "recognize" them as true when I hear
them.
And sometimes I seem to learn things that I could not possibly
be aware of. When I learn to swing a golf club properly, I learn to
use certain muscles in certain ways. I am not aware of which
muscles I use and how I use them differently. I find it hard to
believe that I was aware of those things when I learned them.
What I was aware of was what the golf pro said to me. But that was
declarative, and what I learned (how to swing) was procedural. It
took lots of practice to translate what was told (the declarative
knowledge) into what I can do (the procedural knowledge). I was
almost certainly aware of the former, but it is hard for me to see in
what sense I might have been aware of the latter.
S&S seem to have a narrower view of learning than I do. They
might say that I did not leam (say) that "France has a city that
begins with a T*" from "Paris is the capital of France" when I
heard "Paris is the capital of France." I inferred it later. I prefer to
say that one learns x at time t if one did not know x before time t
and knows it afterwards. Under my definition, all three of my
examples would count as learning, and therefore as implicit
learning.
It is almost impossible to prevent humans from learning far
more than they could reasonably be aware of. Awareness would
have to be very clever to latch onto everything one learns from
"Paris is the capital of France" and very big to hold them all.
As a computer scientist, I look at implicit learning from a point
of view somewhat different from S&S s. When I put things into a
computers memory, a great deal depends on where I put it and
how it is therefore connected to the other information in that
memory.
When I put a fact, like "Paris the capital of France," into a
* database it affects the future behavior — the way the system
o responds to queries — in all sorts of ways that I, who know both the
( fact and the organization of the database, cannot determine.
< When I put a rule like "From X is the capital of France to infer X
; is Paris" into an expert system, I am aware of the rule. What I am
not aware of is the way that the rule will influence the future
responses of the system.
When I adjust the parameters in a neural net to represent the
fact that Paris is the capital of France, it is hard for me to see how
those parameter settings could possibly be the objects of the
systems awareness.
It is not just that I am not aware of what such systems "learn"
when a newpiece of information is put into them. I cannot imagine
how I could be aware. There is even a theorem, a consequence of
Turing's (1936) proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem,
that tells me that (if I have only the power of a computing
machine) I cannot even figure out, in general, what all the
consequences of making a change in a computers data or program
are. If I can't figure them out, how can I be aware of them?
Why, you might ask, should we care?
It seems to me that we should care because almost everything we
learn that really matters is learned implicitly. If school teachers
believed that all learning was explicit, they would miss most of what
students learn in school. If I am right, what students learn to do, they
learn implicitly. Nobody tells students that mathematics is difficult
or that history is boring. But most of them learn it. And, because they
learn it implicitly, the learning lasts and is hard to change.
There is a lot of merit in Shanks's & St. John's criticisms of
attempts to demonstrate implicit learning. But the fact that these
attempts have not wholly succeeded does not mean that what they
are looking for does not exist. It may be hard to "see" implicit
learning, but that does not necessarily mean that it is not there.
If you are piloting a ship, you can only see part of an iceberg. But
it is useful to remember that it is the part you cannot see that you
should worry about.
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Abstract: In the original target article (Shanks & St. John 1994),
one of our principal conclusions was that there is almost no
evidence that learning can occur outside awareness. The continu-
ing commentaries raise some interesting questions, especially
about the definition of learning, but do not lead us to abandon our
conclusion.
Kugel s entertaining and provocative commentary presents
a challenge to our arguments that did not arise in the earlier
round of discussion. We claimed that most human learning
is accompanied by awareness of what is being learned, but
Kugel disputes this idea by proposing a new definition of
learning that makes it implausible in the extreme that all
learning is conscious. Since this definition has some super-
ficial plausibility, it behooves us to look at Kugel s argument
carefully.
To begin with, we must note that there is a deep confu-
sion in the way learning is defined in Kugel's commentary.
He proposes that when a person learns that multiplication
is associative, what is actually learned is just a set of facts
(1X2 = 2X1,4X5 = 5X4, etc.). But there is a major
ambiguity here. The "definition" either means (1) that
there is a set of facts (e.g., 1 X 2 = 2 X 1) to which people
will now assent but to which they would not have assented
previously, or (2) is circular. This circularity follows from
the fact that learning is defined in terms of itself ("When I
learn that multiplication is associative, I seem to learn that
1X2 = 2X1... "). On the latter conception, how do we
know what it is to learn that 1X2 = 2X1? If learning that
1X2 = 2X1 is defined in terms of another set of things
that are learned (e.g., 1X2X3 = 2X1X3,1X2X 438 =
2 X 1 X 438, etc.), then we face an infinite regress with no
true definition of learning in prospect. We will proceed on
the assumption, therefore, that it is version (1) that Kugel is
defending, because version (2) just does not seem to be a
definition at all.
Version (1) defines learning in terms of a set of new
behaviors or dispositions - it is, then, just a standard
behaviorist conception of learning. Seen in this light, it
should hardly be necessary for us to go into detail to show
why it is inadequate, since this is a job that has been done
for us by fifty years of philosophical and psychological
debate (see Bechtel 1988). Briefly, the main difficulty with
a behaviorist conception of learning is that it provides no
basis for generalization. If I observe somebody assenting to
the propositions 1X2 = 2X1,4X5 = 5X4,3X8 = 8X
3, 127 X 458 = 458 X 127, I can make the reasonable
prediction that they will also agree that 17 X 6 = 6 X 17.
But this prediction is only licensed if I assume that the
person has learned the proposition that multiplication is
associative, which represents a generalization covering the
observed behaviors. If all that has been acquired from the
learning episode is a set of new behaviors and behavioral
dispositions, then it must remain unexplained that the
person, when tested, agrees that 17 X 6 = 6 X 17.
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Kugel argues that it is often impossible to predict.the
way a system will behave when given a new fact; and,
because learning is defined in terms of a set of new
dispositions, Kugel concludes from this that learning can-
not possibly be conscious. However, there are two diffi-
culties here. First, it does not make sense to talk about a
disposition being conscious or unconscious since it is a
potential, not a real thing (and of course true behaviorists
would never use terms like "conscious" or "unconscious" in
the first place). But a disposition can no more be conscious
than unconscious, so Kugel must be equally committed to
denying that any learning is conscious: there can be no such
thing as explicit learning. Yet Kugel seems unaware of this
commitment, because he readily agrees that he can be
aware of what the golf pro says to him. How can this be the
case if what he learns from the golf pro is just a set of
dispositions? Second, we dispute the claim that it is often
impossible to predict the way a system will behave when
given a new fact (at least with respect to standard symbolic
databases). It may be difficult to predict behavior, but it is
still the case that in such systems behavior is determined by
inferences made over stored facts.
On our view, learning should be construed in terms of the
acquisition of mental states whose content fixes what is
learned. The content of the acquired knowledge is not
picked out by specifying a large set of new behaviors and
behavioral dispositions. Rather, these behaviors and dispo-
sitions are caused by mental states that are implicit in what
is originally learned (we are using "implicit" here in the
informational sense of Kirsh 1990) rather than being explic-
itly represented.
It is undoubtedly true that the term "learning" is ex-
tremely hard to define (indeed Kugel s confusion attests to
this). But we doubt that the behaviorist definition that
Kugel seems to be advocating - which would admittedly
challenge the thesis of our target article - is sustainable.
Furedy & Kristjansson confirm what we concluded in
the target article, namely, that CS-US awareness is neces-
sary for human Pavlovian conditioning (i.e., conditioning
does not occur without awareness). Contrary to what they
suggest, we made no claims about the possible causal
relationship of the one in producing the other. The indispu-
table fact that awareness is not sufficient for conditioning
seems to have no bearing on the central issues of our target
article. Furedy & Kristjansson have a curious conception of
conditioning, which we have previously commented upon
(Shanks 1990).
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